“Now what?” in Social Ontology and Metaethics

Abstract

Error theorists of all stripes face the “Now what?”-question: what do we do with our judgements if they are systematically erroneous? The question is perhaps most commonly discussed with error theories about all moral judgements or all normative judgements in mind. But other error theories are possible. As it matters particularly for our social coordination and is ideologically and emotionally charged, I consider an error theory about corporate moral responsibility judgements—both for its own sake and to see if it generates lessons about how to answer the “Now what?”-question more generally. First, I argue that an error theory about corporate moral responsibility judgements plausibly could be true, which gives us reason to explore the “Now what?”-question about it. Then I argue that if it is, we should become revisionary expressivists about corporate moral responsibility judgements. This allows us to preserve our interests in these judgements better than alternative responses, including abolitionism, conservationism, fictionalism, propagandism, and revisionary naturalism. Finally, I generalize to more familiar error theories. Altering some assumptions, the lessons from “Now what?” about corporate moral responsibility judgements also make revisionary expressivism generalize to answer the “Now what?”-questions faced by more familiar error theories.