Journal of Social Ontology https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso <p>The <em>Journal of Social Ontology</em> (JSO) is an interdisciplinary journal devoted to <strong>social ontology</strong> and <strong>collective intentionality</strong> that was founded in 2015. It is supported by <a href="https://isosonline.org/">International Social Ontology Society</a> and the University of Vienna. JSO features scholarly work pertaining to the <strong>basic structures of the social world</strong> from a variety of disciplinary perspectives including <strong>moral</strong>, <strong>social</strong> and <strong>political philosophy</strong>, <strong>anthropology</strong>, <strong>cognitive science</strong>, <strong>economics</strong>, <strong>history</strong>, <strong>law</strong>, <strong>political science</strong>, and <strong>psychology</strong>. The topics that JSO covers range from small-scale everyday interactions to encompassing <strong>societal institutions</strong>, from expert teams to hierarchical organizations, and from unintended consequences to <strong>institutional design</strong>. The journal provides a forum for exchanges between scholars of diverse disciplinary and methodological backgrounds. In addition to major articles, JSO publishes review essays, discussion articles, and book reviews.</p> en-US contact.jso.philosophy@univie.ac.at (Leah Ritterfeld | Journal of Social Ontology) contact.jso.philosophy@univie.ac.at (Paul Tucek | Journal of Social Ontology) Sat, 24 Sep 2022 17:50:46 +0200 OJS 3.2.1.3 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 Frontmatter https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/7579 Journal of Social Ontology Copyright (c) 2022 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/7579 Sat, 24 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0200 Individuating Goods on Markets with a View Towards Ethics and Economics https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/7122 <p style="font-weight: 400;">This paper proposes that goods (the things exchanged in financial transactions and an object of study in economics) should be individuated according to a two-place relation constituted by an object and a description. Several of the problems in contemporary philosophy of economics involve shifting focus from objects to descriptions, while certain phenomena central to micro-economics, market regulation, and political economy require consideration of one of the two places. The paper argues thatby considering both constituents in a relation, many of those issues can be more effectively addressed, communicated, and even resolved. The issues that may be so resolved include the seminal discussions of transformable goods, or goods whose existenceor relevant properties are impacted by their means of acquisition (e.g., buying, giving, awarding, etc.). The two-place approachto individuation shows how the cases of transformable goods can be more effectively addressed without incurring problematicmetaphysical commitments which may spiral out into confusion in the ethical and social scientific literature. The paper thenargues that the two-place approach can be leveraged into more fruitful discussion in microeconomics and the ongoing literature inthe metaphysics and ethics of markets.</p> Joshua Stein Copyright (c) 2022 Joshua Stein https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/7122 Fri, 23 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0200 Concessive Joint Action https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/7307 <p>Representative theorists of joint action traditionally argue that shared intention is necessary for joint action and that it must be common knowledge among participants that they share intentions (Bratman 1993; 2014; Gilbert 1996; 2014; Miller 2001; Searle 1990; 2010; Tuomela 2005; 2013; Tuomela &amp; Miller 1985) However, minimalists criticize these conditions; many of them contend that common knowledge is unnecessary (Blomberg, 2016). In fact, the absence of common knowledge is occasionally necessary to induce the occurrence of joint action (Schönherr, 2019). Other minimalists even argue that the assertion of shared intentions is too zealous (Butterfill, 2012). In general, however, even minimalists accept or not seriously question the following assumption: The goal shared by people in initiating a joint action is the one whose realization amounts to the accomplishment of that action. I utilize a class of counterexamples that I label concessive joint action to argue that this assumption is excessive.</p> Nayuta Miki Copyright (c) 2022 Nayuta Miki https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/7307 Fri, 23 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0200 The Making of Ancestral Persons https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6856 <p style="font-weight: 400;">In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Katrin Flikschuh (2016) casting doubts on a theoretical account ofancestral persons in the work of Ifeanyi Menkiti. She argues both that their ontological status is uncertain and that they areontologically redundant. I argue that she does not succeed in convincing us to settle for a practical justification of ancestors. Ithen supplement Menkiti’s life-history account of post-mortem persistence with Searle’s account of social ontology with a viewto theoretically justify belief in the existence of ancestral persons.</p> Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe Copyright (c) 2022 Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6856 Fri, 23 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0200 (Re)conceptualizing the genesis of a “we is greater than me” psychological orientation: Sartre meets Tomasello https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/7311 <p style="font-weight: 400;">Drawing on many areas of expertise, from paleontology to psychology, Tomasello offers a plausible, evolutionary story abouthow our ancestors are likely to have developed cooperative behaviors and collaborative lifeways in order to survive and thrive.He also claims that this narrative explains why they would have begun to <em>think </em>in characteristically <em>cooperative </em>and moral ways,developing a “we is greater than me” [we&gt;me] psychological orientation. Do the arguments offered support this extra claim? Thisarticle suggests that they do not. It seeks to alleviate this shortcoming by drawing upon some conceptual resources offered bySartre’s <em>Theory of Practical Ensembles. </em>The centerpiece of the article consists of a detailed analysis of Sartre’s account of the genesisof the “group-in-fusion,” seeking to show that the genesis of a we-way of thinking in a group made up of <em>many </em>requires themediation of what Sartre calls a “third party” (<em>le tiers</em>). After closely examining Sartre’s treatment of the “third party” in theapocalyptic genesis of the “group-in-fusion,” I evaluate the success of this notion in resolving those questions that Tomasello’saccount raises while, at the same time, addressing the ontological question concerning the nature of the individual-grouprelation, in a way that suggests new and significant alternatives to standard dilemmas in contemporary social philosophy.</p> Lucia Angelino Copyright (c) 2022 Lucia Angelino https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/7311 Fri, 23 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0200 Disobedient Institutional Behavior https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/7419 <p style="font-weight: 400;">The paper aims to explain different cases of disobedient institutional behavior using the attitude-based model. The issue of how to analyze and capture the faces of disobedience in a simple model is approached in three steps: first, misbehavior is defined as a certain lack in normative attitudes; second, these attitudes are distinguished in terms of normative acceptance and normative guidance; and third, combinations of these attitudes represent basic types of disobedience: <em>opposing, transgressing </em>and<em> conforming.</em> These three categories constitute an analytical typology of disobedient agents compatible with the theory of social institutions.</p> Vojtěch Zachník Copyright (c) 2022 Vojtěch Zachník https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/7419 Fri, 23 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0200 Haslanger, Marx, and the Social Ontology of Unitary Theory: Debating Capitalism’s Relationship to Race and Gender https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/7441 <div class="page" title="Page 1"> <div class="layoutArea"> <div class="column"> <p style="font-weight: 400;">Taking up a recent critique of Nancy Fraser by Sally Haslanger, this paper defends the primary thesis of Marxist-Feminist unitarytheory that the systematic reproduction of modern forms of racial and gendered oppression is due to their co-articulation with thereproduction of capitalist social relations against three criticisms offered by Haslanger. It develops its defense of Fraser’s articulation of unitary theory by acknowledging a social ontological deficit in that theory insofar as it does not contain a theory of thesocial construction of human kinds and amending this deficit by drawing on revised aspects of Haslanger’s own work. It arguesthat the global reproduction of race and gender as hierarchical social relations is a consequence of the reproduction of capitalism although local gender and race kinds are asymmetrically co-constituted by non-capitalist social practices.</p> </div> </div> </div> Aaron Berman Copyright (c) 2022 Aaron Berman https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/7441 Fri, 23 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0200