Minimal Group Agency
A Bio-Social Ontology
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.25365/jso-2025-8918Keywords:
group agency, enactivism, normativity, intentionality, moral responsibility, organicism, power, organizational closureAbstract
When considering the type of agency that supports group activity, social ontologists often think of full-fledged moral and intentional agency. However, many organism-agents found in the biological sphere fail not only to be morally responsible but also would seem incapable of the rational guidance characteristic of intentional agency. This raises the possibility that some groups may qualify as minimal agents without necessarily qualifying as moral or intentional agents. In this paper, I review conditions for minimal agency as set forth by enactivists and draw from existing social ontological work to explore the extent to which these conditions might be satisfied by existing accounts of group agency. Although no account of group agency perfectly aligns with the enactivist conditions, I conclude that a suitably modified version of List and Pettit's account could.
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