Social Groups, Structure, and Change
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.25365/jso-2025-8699Keywords:
social groups, structure, change, persistence, structuralismAbstract
The social groups we are often concerned with, such as clubs, teams, and bands, are relatively organized. Structures, as complex properties of collections of individuals, play a central role in providing the existence and identity conditions, among other things, for such organized groups. A structuralist view is one that individuates groups primarily in terms of their structures, as opposed to only in terms of their members. Any structuralist view must be able to accommodate not only changes in membership, when a group gains or loses members, but also structural changes, such as when a group gains or loses roles in its structure. I describe and refine two versions of structuralism which allow both kinds of changes. The discussion further highlights the need for a richer conception of structure for the structuralist, in order to limit the kinds of changes that groups can survive as well as distinguish between structurally identical groups. I propose two such conceptions which better capture the complexity inherent in groups.
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