Understanding the Coordinative Function of Stylistic Conventions

Authors

  • Marc Slors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25365/jso-2024-8038

Keywords:

cultural conventions, coordination, conventions, David Lewis, Stylistic conventions

Abstract

Anthropological literature on culture shock assigns a social-coordinative function to stylistic conventions such as etiquette and dress codes. In the philosophical literature on the connection between conventions and coordination, however, it is frequently claimed that stylistic conventions do not solve coordination problems, conceived of as situations of interdependent decision making that can be modelled in game theoretical terms. I argue that the debate on conventions and coordination nevertheless provides tools for understanding how and why stylistic conventions serve a coordinative purpose. Some coordination games allow for stable equilibria only by means of public signals that are external to a game, known as correlation devices. I argue that such devices come in different kinds. In complementary coordination games, primary coordination devices allow for rules that specify role-divisions, while secondary correlation devices make existing role-divisions cognitively tractable. Stylistic conventions can be interpreted as correlation devices of the latter kind. We share etiquette and dress codes as secondary correlation devices that highlight who plays which role, which transactions in role-interactions transpire, and where specific role-interactions can be expected to take place.

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Published

2024-07-15

How to Cite

Slors, Marc. 2024. “Understanding the Coordinative Function of Stylistic Conventions”. Journal of Social Ontology 10 (1). Vienna, Austria:67-86. https://doi.org/10.25365/jso-2024-8038.

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