Common Ground Between Social Ontology, Conceptual Engineering, and Conceptual Ethics
Keywords:Social Kinds, Conceptual Engineering, Conceptual Ethics
Social objects have become common subjects of interest to both social ontologists and conceptual engineers, but up to this point much of the philosophical work from these two fields has surprisingly been done in isolation from each field. I show how these prolific research fields—social ontology, conceptual engineering, and conceptual ethics—can mutually benefit each other through a unifying model I propose called the 2D-CE model that shows the dependence relations between a given concept, its instantiation conditions, and whatever language represents such devices. This model combines a model from social ontology with insights from conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics into a powerful metaphilosophical tool that highlights the role of social agents for metaphysical and metalinguistic explanation. A major benefit of the model is its utility for not only social philosophy, but for other areas of research beyond the social world.
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