Concessive Joint Action
A New Concept in Theories of Joint Action
Keywords:social ontology, joint action, intention, shared goal
Representative theorists of joint action traditionally argue that shared intention is necessary for joint action and that it must be common knowledge among participants that they share intentions (Bratman 1993; 2014; Gilbert 1996; 2014; Miller 2001; Searle 1990; 2010; Tuomela 2005; 2013; Tuomela & Miller 1985) However, minimalists criticize these conditions; many of them contend that common knowledge is unnecessary (Blomberg, 2016). In fact, the absence of common knowledge is occasionally necessary to induce the occurrence of joint action (Schönherr, 2019). Other minimalists even argue that the assertion of shared intentions is too zealous (Butterﬁll, 2012). In general, however, even minimalists accept or not seriously question the following assumption: The goal shared by people in initiating a joint action is the one whose realization amounts to the accomplishment of that action. I utilize a class of counterexamples that I label concessive joint action to argue that this assumption is excessive.
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