Team Reasoning and Intentional Cooperation for Mutual Benefit
Keywords:
team reasoning, mutual benefit, cooperation, collective intention, social preferenceAbstract
This paper proposes a concept of intentional cooperation for mutual benefit. This concept uses a form of team reasoning in which team members aim to achieve common interests, rather than maximising a common utility function, and in which team reasoners can coordinate their behaviour by following pre-existing practices. I argue that a market transaction can express intentions for mutually beneficial cooperation even if, extensionally, participation in the transaction promotes each party’s self-interest.
References
Akerlof, George (1982): “Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange”. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics 97, p. 543–569. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885099
Anderson, Elizabeth (1993): Value in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bacharach, Michael (1993): “Variable Universe Games”. In: Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman and Piero Tani (Eds.). Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 255–275.
Bacharach, Michael (1999): “Interactive Team Reasoning: A Contribution to the Theory of Cooperation”. In: Research in Economics 53, p. 117–147. https://doi.org/10.1006/reec.1999.0188
Bacharach, Michael (2006): Beyond Individual Choice. Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden (Eds). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691186313
Bacharach, Michael, Gerardo Guerra, and Daniel Zizzo (2007): “The Self-fulfilling Property of Trust: An Experimental Study”. In: Theory and Decision 63, p. 349–388. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9043-5
Bardsley, Nicholas (2007): “On Collective Intentions: Collective Action in Economics and Philosophy”. In: Synthese 157, p. 141–159. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9034-z
Bardsley, Nicholas, Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden (2010): “Explaining Focal Points: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory versus Team Reasoning.” In: Economic Journal 120, p. 40–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02304.x
Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Martin Dufwenberg (2007): “Guilt in Games”. In: American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 97, p. 171–176. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.2.170
Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe (1995): “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History”. In: Games and Economic Behavior 10, p. 122–142. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1027
Bolton, Gary and Axel Ockenfels (2000): “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition”. In: American Economic Review 90, p. 166–193. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.1.166
Bratman, Michael (1993): “Shared Iintention”. In: Ethics 104, p. 97–113. https://doi.org/10.1086/293577
Bruni, Luigino and Robert Sugden (2008): “Fraternity: Why the Market Need Not Be a Morally Free Zone”. In: Economics and Philosophy 24, p. 35–64. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267108001661
Bruni, Luigino and Robert Sugden (2013): “Reclaiming Virtue Ethics for Economics”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 27. No. 4, p. 141–164. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.27.4.141
Casajus, André (2001): Focal Points in Framed Games: Breaking the Symmetry. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51112-7
Crawford, Vincent, Uri Gneezy, and Yuval Rottenstreich (2008): “The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures”. In: American Economic Review 98, p. 1443–1458. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.4.1443
Cubitt, Robin and Robert Sugden (2003): “Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis’s Game Theory”. In: Economics and Philosophy 19, p. 175–210. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267103001123
Falk, Armin, Ernst Fehr, and Urs Fischbacher (2003): “On the Nature of Fair Behavior”. In: Economic Inquiry 41, p. 20–26. https://doi.org/10.1093/ei/41.1.20
Fehr, Ernst and Klaus Schmidt (1999): “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation”. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, p. 817–868. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556151
Gilbert, Margaret (1989): On Social Facts. London: Routledge.
Gold, Natalie and Robert Sugden (2007): “Collective Intentions and Team Agency”. In: Journal of Philosophy 104, p. 109–137. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2007104328
Hobbes, Thomas (1651/1962): Leviathan. London: Macmillan.
Hodgson, David (1967): Consequences of Utilitarianism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hume, David (1740/1978): A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oseo/instance.00046221
Janssen, Maarten (2001): “Rationalising Focal Points”. In: Theory and Decision 50, p. 119–148. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010349014718
Lewis, David (1969): Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
List, Christian and Philip Pettit (2011): Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pelligra, Vittorio (2005): “Under Trusting Eyes: The Responsive Nature of Trust”. In: Benedetto Gui and Robert Sugden (Eds.). Economics and Social Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 195–124. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522154.006
Rabin, Matthew (1993). “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics”. In: American Economic Review 83, p. 1281–1302.
Regan, Donald (1980): Utilitarianism and Cooperation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246091.001.0001
Sandel, Michael J. (2012): What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Schelling, Thomas (1960): The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Searle, John (1990): “Collective Intentions and Actions”. In: Philip Cohen, Jerry Morgan and Martha Pollack (Eds.). Intentions in Communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 401–415.
Smith, Adam (1776/1976): An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oseo/instance.00043218
Sugden, Robert (1984): “Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions”. In: Economic Journal 94, p. 772–787. https://doi.org/10.2307/2232294
Sugden, Robert (1985): “Liberty, Preference and Choice”. In: Economics and Philosophy 1, p. 213–229. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100002479
Sugden, Robert (1991): “Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy”. In: Economic Journal 101, p. 751–785. https://doi.org/10.2307/2233854
Sugden, Robert (1993): “Thinking as a Team: Toward an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior”. In: Social Philosophy and Policy 10, p. 69–89. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500004027
Sugden, Robert (1995): “A theory of Focal Points”. In: Economic Journal 105, p. 533–550. https://doi.org/10.2307/2235016
Sugden, Robert (2011): “Mutual Advantage, Conventions and Team Reasoning”. In: International Review of Economics 58, p. 9–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-011-0114-0
Tuomela, Raimo and Kaarlo Miller (1988): “We-Intentions”. In: Philosophical Studies 53, p. 367–389. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353512
von Neumann, John and Oskar Morgenstern (1947): Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 2nd Ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2014 Robert Sugden
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 Unported License.
