Modest Sociality: Continuities and Discontinuities

Authors

  • Elisabeth Pacherie Institut Jean Nicod ENS, EHESS, CNRS, Institut d’Etudes Cognitives, Ecole Normale Supérieure

Keywords:

Michael Bratman, shared agency, joint action, shared representations, discontinuities

Abstract

A central claim in Michael Bratman’s account of shared agency is that there need be no radical conceptual, metaphysical or normative discontinuity between robust forms of small-scale shared intentional agency, i.e., modest sociality, and individual planning agency. What I propose to do is consider another potential discontinuity, whose existence would throw doubt on his contention that the structure of a robust form of modest sociality is entirely continuous with structures at work in individual planning agency. My main point will be that he may be wrong in assuming that the basic cognitive infrastructure sufficient to support individual agency doesn’t have to be supplemented in significant ways to support shared agency.

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Published

2014-12-15

How to Cite

Pacherie, Elisabeth. 2014. “Modest Sociality: Continuities and Discontinuities”. Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1). Vienna, Austria:17-26. https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6876.

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Book Symposium