Collective Intentionality and Causal Powers

Authors

  • Dave Elder-Vass Loughborough University

Keywords:

collective intentionality, institutional reality, critical realism, norm circles, John Searle

Abstract

Bridging two traditions of social ontology, this paper examines the possibility that the concept of collective intentionality can help to explain the mechanisms underpinning the causal powers of some social entities. In particular, I argue that a minimal form of collective intentionality is part of the mechanism underpinning the causal power of norm circles: the social entities causally responsible for social norms. There are, however, many different forms of social entity with causal power, and the relationship of collective intentionality to these causal powers varies, depending on the form of the mechanism underpinning the power concerned. Some powers depend on collective intentionality, and others do not.

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Published

2015-09-05

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