Morality, Friendship, and Collective Action


  • Javier Gomez-Lavin York University
  • Matthew Rachar Douglas College



collective action, joint action, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, experimental philosophy, friendship, morality


This paper uses the tools of experimental philosophy to examine the nature of interpersonal normativity in collective action, focusing on cases of immoral collective action and collective action by friends. The results of our two studies, which expand on recent empirical interventions into longstanding debates in social ontology, demonstrate that according to our everyday judgments there are interpersonal obligations in cases of collective action, even when immoral, and that, while friendship elicits judgments of togetherness, it does not affect the norms of collective action. We also situate these results in the philosophical literature and discuss their consequences for a “pluralism” about sociality.


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How to Cite

Gomez-Lavin, Javier, and Matthew Rachar. 2024. “Morality, Friendship, and Collective Action”. Journal of Social Ontology 10 (March). Vienna, Austria:1-45.