A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention
Keywords:
shared intention, psychological and normative aspects, psychological roles, interpersonal obligations, relianceAbstract
In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose can explain why it is not a mere accident that both (I) and (II) are true of shared intention, while psychological and normative views cannot. The basic idea is that shared intention involves a structure of attitudes of individuals – including, most importantly, attitudes of reliance – which normally plays the relevant motivating roles and creates the relevant obligations.
References
Alonso, Facundo (2009): “Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations”. In: Ethics 119, p. 444–475. https://doi.org/10.1086/599984
Alonso, Facundo (2014): “What is Reliance?” In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44, p. 163–183. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.919722
Alonso, Facundo (2016): “Reasons for Reliance”. In: Ethics 126, p. 311–338. https://doi.org/10.1086/683536
Bratman, Michael (1987): Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Bratman, Michael (1999a): Faces of Intention. Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625190
Bratman, Michael (1999b): “Introduction: Planning Agents in a Social World”. In: Faces of Intention p. 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625190.001
Bratman, Michael (1999c): “Shared Intention”. Reprinted in: Faces of Intention, p. 109–129. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625190.006
Bratman, Michael (1999d): “Shared Intention and Mutual Obligation”. Reprinted in: Faces of Intention, p. 130–141. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625190.007
Bratman, Michael (1999e): “I Intend that We J”. Reprinted in: Faces of Intention p. 142–161. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625190.008
Bratman, Michael (2006): “Dynamics of Sociality”. In: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30, p. 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2006.00125.x
Bratman, Michael (2009): “Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention”. In: Philosophical Studies 144, p. 149–165. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9375-9
Bratman, Michael (2014): Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199897933.001.0001
Butterfill, Stephen (2012): “Joint Action and Development”. In: Philosophical Quarterly 61, p. 23–47. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00005.x
Darwall, Stephen (2006): The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Darwall, Stephen (2011): “Demystifying Promises”. In: Hanoch Scheinman (Ed.): Promises and Agreements. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 255–276. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377958.003.0011
Darwall, Stephen (2012): “Bipolar Obligation”. In: Russ Shafer-Landau (Ed.): Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Volume 7, p. 333–357. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0011
Gibbard, Allan (1990): Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Gilbert, Margaret (1992): On Social Facts. Princeton: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214627
Gilbert, Margaret (1996a): Living Together. Rationality, Sociality and Obligation. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Gilbert, Margaret (1996b): “Agreement, Coercion, and Obligation”. Reprinted in: Living Together, p. 281–312. https://doi.org/10.1086/293548
Gilbert, Margaret (1996c): “Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon”. Reprinted in Living Together, p. 177–194. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1990.tb00202.x
Gilbert, Margaret (2000a): Sociality and Responsibility.New Essays in Plural Subject Theory. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Gilbert, Margaret (2000b): “Introduction: Sociality and Plural Subject Theory”. In: Sociality and Responsibility, p. 1–13.
Gilbert, Margaret (2000c): “What Is It For Us To Intend?” Reprinted in: Sociality and Responsibility, p. 14–36.
Gilbert, Margaret (2000d): “Reconsidering the ‘Actual Contract’ Theory of Political Obligation”. Reprinted: in Sociality and Responsibility, p. 97–122. https://doi.org/10.1086/233895
Gilbert, Margaret (2004): “Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees’ Rights”. In: Journal of Philosophy 102, p. 83–109. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil200410126
Gilbert, Margaret (2006): A Theory of Political Obligation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199274959.001.0001
Gilbert, Margaret (2009): “Shared Intention and Personal Intentions”. In: Philosophical Studies 144, p. 167–187. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9372-z
Gilbert, Margaret (2011): “Three Dogmas About Promising”. In: Hanoch Scheinman (Ed.): Promises and Agreements. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 80–108. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377958.003.0003
Gilbert, Margaret (2013): Joint Commitment. How We Make the Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199970148.001.0001
Hart, H. L. A. (1955): “Are There Any Natural Rights?” In: Philosophical Review 64, p. 175–191. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315236308-4
Korsgaard, Christine (2009): Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552795.001.0001
MacCormick, Neil (1982): Legal Right and Social Democracy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Owens, David (2012): Shaping the Normative Landscape. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.001.0001
Pacherie, Elizabeth (2013): “Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite”. In: Synthese 190, p. 1817–1839. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0263-7
Railton, Peter (2003): Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613982
Railton, Peter (2006): “Normative Guidance”. In: Russ Shafer-Landau (Ed.): Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Volume 1, p. 3–34.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu (2004): “Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments”. In: Philosophical Review 113, p. 359–410. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-3-359
Roth, Abraham Sesshu (2014): “Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity”. In: Noûs 48, p. 626–652. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12011
Scanlon, Thomas (1998): What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, Thomas (2003): The Difficulty of Tolerance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615153
Scanlon, Thomas (2008): Moral Dimensions. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674043145
Searle, John (1990): “Collective Intentions and Actions”. In: Philip Cohen, Jerry Morgan, and Martha Pollack (Eds.): Intentions in Communication. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, p. 401–415.
Thompson, Michael (2004): “What Is It To Wrong Someone? A Puzzle About Justice”. In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith (Eds.): Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 333–384.
Tuomela, Raimo (2005): “We-Intentions Revisited”. In: Philosophical Studies 125, p. 327–369. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-7781-1
Tuomela, Raimo (2007): The Philosophy of Sociality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313390.001.0001
Tuomela, Raimo and Kaarlo Miller (1988): “We-Intentions”. In: Philosophical Studies 63, p. 367–389. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618204-003
Velleman, J. David (1997): “How To Share An Intention”. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, p. 29–50. https://doi.org/10.2307/2953776
Wallace, R. Jay (2013): “The Deontic Structure of Morality”. In: David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker, and Margaret O. Little (Eds.): Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 137–167. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604678.003.0008
Warnock, George (1971): The Object of Morality. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd.
Watson, Gary (2009): “Promises, Reasons, and Normative Powers”. In: David Sobel and Steven Wall (Eds.): Reasons for Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 155–178. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511720185.008
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2016 Facundo M. Alonso
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 Unported License.
