Mental Disorder and the Indirect Construction of Social Facts

Authors

  • Raphael van Riel University Duisburg-Essen,

Keywords:

construction, “count as”, intentionality-dependence, psychiatry, mental disorder

Abstract

In this paper, I argue for two claims, (i) that on a common conception of the second order property of being a mental disorder, some facts about mental disorders are the result of social constructions, and (ii) that the way facts about mental disorders are constructed differs from the received view on social construction. The difference is examined, a novel type of social construction is identified, and it is suggested that there are numerous other types of social facts that are constructed in a similar way.

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Published

2016-10-21

How to Cite

van Riel, Raphael. 2016. “Mental Disorder and the Indirect Construction of Social Facts”. Journal of Social Ontology 3 (1). Vienna, Austria:27-48. https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6823.

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